When calibrating spatial partial equilibrium models with conjectural variations, some modelers fit the suppliers' sales to the available data in addition to total consumption and price levels. While this certainly enhances the quality of the calibration, it makes it difficult to accommodate user-imposed bounds on the model parameters such as restricting the market power parameters to the interval [0,1], which is a common requirement in conjectural variations approaches. We propose an algorithm to calibrate the suppliers' sales and simultaneously deal with user-defined bounds on parameters. To this end, we fix the suppliers' sales at reference values and obtain the marginal costs for each supplier and market. We then limit the market power parameters to the interval [0,1], and calculate intervals of anchor prices and price elasticities that reproduce the reference supplier sales in the state of equilibrium. If these intervals do not contain the reference price elasticities and prices, we face a mismatch between reality and the model mechanics. We resolve this by altering the reference sales for the critical suppliers, and iterate. Thereby, the user controls whether price elasticities and anchor prices should be close to their reference values, or the suppliers' sales. The algorithm is tested on data from the European gas market, and required less than one minute to identify calibrated parameters. Our algorithm is widely applicable, since it is based on mild (and common) underlying assumptions and can be configured to suit a specific purpose thanks to the inclusion of user-defined bounds on all relevant parameters.
Introduction
With the advancement in computer technology, an increasing number of market studies is based on mathematical models. A popular way of modeling a network of markets is via a spatial partial equilibrium model including conjectural variations (CV). However, the calibration problem associated with these models turns out to be a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), as one aims to minimize the deviations between some of the parameters of the model and their reference values subject to the original equilibrium problem. Unfortunately, MPECs have a non-convex solution space and are thus difficult and time-consuming to solve for large models.
An alternative method is used by Lise et al. [18] , Cobanli [3] and other gas market modelers. First, consumption per node and time period is fixed and, under the assumption of perfectly competitive markets, the nodal prices are computed. Then the inverse demand functions are derived from predefined price elasticities and the obtained consumption-price pairs, and the equilibrium is computed again under the assumption of imperfectly competitive markets; this reduces consumption and increases price levels. The inverse demand functions are successively shifted outwards until the original consumption levels are matched.
The resulting nodal prices also depend on the predefined market power parameters (conjectural parameters) of the suppliers and the price elasticities of the consumers; some modelers consider these parameters as well to achieve better results. Chyong & Hobbs [2] tune the price elasticities while leaving the market power parameters at their fixed values. While the achieved equilibrium is impressively close to what is observed in reality, this method can yield unrealisticly price-inelastic consumers.
In contrast, García-Alcalde et al. [11] , Liu et al. [19] and other electricity market modelers [21, 20, 5, 17, 6, 4] tune the market power parameters while leaving price elasticities fixed. The strength of this approach is that the information contained in the level and spatial distribution of the sales of the suppliers is used for calibration, instead of basing the values of the market power parameters on the experience of the modeler. On the downside, the marginal supply costs of each trader have to be known. While this can be approximated by the production costs in the single-market settings of García-Alcalde et al. [11] and the other modelers, the task is more difficult in a network of markets, because transport costs, congestion fees, etc. have to be included. Moreover, the market power parameters are allowed to take arbitrary values, even though, in the absence of cartels, only values between 0 and 1 can be associated with the CV approach, see for instance Tremblay & Tremblay [22, Chapter 12] .
In this work, we propose a new calibration algorithm that bridges these gaps by finding market power parameters in the interval [0, 1] based on reference data on sales from individual suppliers to consumers, while maintaining wholesale price levels, price elasticities, and nodal consumption within user-defined bounds.
Calibration Framework

Oligopolistic market representation
We describe an oligopolistic market by an equilibrium problem comprising the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the optimization problems of thē f traders supplying the market, and the market clearing condition. 0 ≤ −λ − θ f dΛ(s) ds q f + φ f ⊥ q f ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F = {f 1 , . . . , ff }. (2.1)
λ is the market price, θ f is the market power parameter of trader f in the set of all traders F with access to market, Λ(s) is the inverse demand function, s := f ∈F q f is the total consumption in the market, q f is the quantity sold by trader f , and φ f is trader f 's marginal cost of supplying q f .
We require the inverse demand function Λ(s) to be bijective and have the following characteristics in its anchor point (s 0 , λ 0 ):
where s 0 > 0 is the anchor consumption, λ 0 ≥ 0 the anchor price, and η := ∂s ∂λ λ 0 · λ 0 s 0 < 0 the price elasticity of demand in (s 0 , λ 0 ). While s 0 , λ 0 , and η are subject to calibration, as discussed in the next section, the functional form of Λ(s) can be freely chosen by the modeler.
Problem statement
When calibrating CV models, the goal is to tune parameters s 0 , λ 0 , η, and θ, such that the resulting model equilibrium (λ
. . , θf ), depending on context; q f and φ f are abbreviated similarly. In fact, by defining the market power parameters In the remainder of this section we derive three modules, based on which we then formulate a calibration algorithm overcoming these difficulties.
• Module I (Section 2.3) introduces how the marginal costs φ ref of supplying q ref can be determined using the model.
• Module II (Section 2.4) derives ranges on the anchor price λ 0 ∈ [λ 0 , λ 0 ] and the price elasticity η ∈ [η, η] for which the market power parameters
• 5) which are additional KKT conditions from adding the constraint q f = q ref f
to the original optimization problem of each trader f . ξ f are the shadow prices associated with these constraints and therefore also appear in Equation (2.1), which now reads 
, Equation (2.1) implies that the following equation holds in equilibrium.
is non-negative for all valid choices of λ 0 , η, and
we conclude that the wholesale price in equilibrium λ * = λ 0 is at least as large as the highest marginal supply cost of the supplying traders.
Furthermore, λ 0 is at most equal to marginal cost of the supplying trader with the lowest cost plus its maximum market power markup.
We can reformulate condition (2.9) to provide an upper bound on (−η) instead of λ 0 :
For f ∈ F 0 Equation (2.1) reads 11) limiting the price in equilibrium λ 0 to the lowest marginal cost among the nonsupplying traders with access to the market:
Summarizing, if we limit θ to the interval [0, 1] and consider the properties (2.3), λ 0 and η have to be in the ranges
If the boundary values of the admissible ranges satisfy λ 0 ≥ λ 0 and (−η) > (−η), 
is in the interval [0, 1]. In a second step, we want to find a new equilibrium in the direction of q est . To this end, we augment the original model by
These complementarity constraints are the KKT conditions of additional constraints in the traders' optimization problems. ξ
, and χ are the shadow prices associated with these constraints and therefore also appear in Equation (2.1), which now reads
By solving the augmented model comprising Equations (2.2), (2.16), and (2.17), with parameters s
Note that λ * = λ 0 follows from the definition of the inverse demand function (2.3) and constraint (2.16c).
Definition of the calibration algorithm
From the previously introduced modules we can formulate a calibration algorithm for CV models.
• 
, and terminate the calibration. Otherwise, move to Step 4.
• .2), and TOL the maximum allowed deviation to the reference value.
Numerical example
We demonstrate the functionality of the proposed algorithm by applying it to the gas market model introduced by Baltensperger et al. [1] . The model represents the European Union (EU) markets and their main suppliers over 2 periods (summer and winter), consists of 43 nodes and 247 arcs, and is represented by 9432 complementarity conditions (including Equations (2.1) and (2.2)). The model equations and an exemplary model with two interconnected nodes are shown in Appendix C. The model and the calibration algorithm were implemented in MATLAB and solved by CPLEX. It takes a quad-core 3.4 GHz CPU 5.7 seconds on the average to compute one iteration of the algorithm, whereas the main computational burden originates from solving the augmented version of the model in Module III.
Historical data (λ data , q data , s data , η data ) was obtained from various sources [10, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23] . As is often the case in practice, the total consumption did not match the reported sales of the traders 
where N is the set of all nodes, and T the set of all time periods. Equations (2.16a) and (2.16b) were altered to constrain q f nt
is the total quantity produced by trader f in period t, andLOSS f t an estimate of the lost fraction of gas until it reaches the consumers. Otherwise, the q data f nt 's were scaled down to fit these inequalities, because s data nt and p data f t are among the most accurate figures available for the gas market. In other situations, different parameters might be prioritized. We obtain (λ
For better readability, we drop subscripts n and t in the following.
In our example, we set λ , and highlights the interplay between the parameters, which allows the user to take informed decisions on how the mismatch between model and reality is resolved.
Summary and Outlook
We propose an iterative algorithm to calibrate conjectural variations models for a network of markets. The algorithm builds upon three modules. In Module I, the marginal supply costs φ f are derived for all traders f from the sales q The example indicates that the algorithm is able to calibrate a network of markets to real world data fast after a small number of iterations. The presented algorithm is broadly applicable, since the assumptions on which it is based are very mild and common in spatial partial equilibrium modeling. Furthermore, the algorithm can easily be configured to specific purposes, since the reference values and their tolerances can be chosen by the user. Finally, the algorithm can easily be expanded; for instance, one could follow the approach taken by Huppmann & Egging [12] and (manually) adjust the underlying marginal cost parameters of specific system services to provoke a more favorable outcome of the sales per trader.
Future work should emphasize on extending the update step of the algorithm, such that the sizes of the ranges of the various reference values can be weighed against each other and adjusted accordingly. In order to further increase the plausibility of the outcome with respect to economic theory, we also aim to improve how the algorithm sets these ranges relatively to each other. For instance, the market power parameters could be restricted to be larger in the high demand season than in the low demand season. Furthermore, we expect to achieve a reduction of iterations by exploiting the problem structure even further, particularly when determining the new set of sales per trader q new in the update step.
Appendix A. Calibration algorithm specific notation , which are countries with low consumption compared to the total production of their supplier, the available pipeline capacity for imports, and the regasification capacity.
Furthermore, we observe that the changes from We learn from .10) ). The algorithm concludes from this difference that consumers in Italy are willing to buy gas at high prices and therefore assigns low (−η) and high market power parameters (Tables B.2  and B. 3), which coincides with the interpretation an economist would make CZ 0.14 0.14 0.14 0 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.28 0.14 0.14 DK 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.32 0.14 0.14 PT 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.14 0 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.14 Moreover, the θ's are generally higher in the European summer than in winter, which is rather counter-intuitive from an economic point of view; one would expect traders to exert less market power in times demand and prices are low. However, this finding can be explained by the interplay of the market power parameters θ and λ 0 . On one hand, Equation (2. 
for the summer period. As a consequence, our calibration gives rather low θ's in winter and rather high θ's in summer. We carried out additional simulations, for which the results are not shown here, with a spread of 10 % and 20 % between summer and winter reference prices. For the former setting, the average θ is similar in both seasons, while in the latter the average θ is clearly higher in the high demand period. We conclude that the reference data greatly influences the obtained equilibrium and the corresponding parameters, and therefore should be carefully chosen.
Appendix C. Model equations and exemplary market setting
Appendix C is largely reproduced from Baltensperger et al. [1] . We introduce the model equations in Appendix C.1, show an exemplary market setting with two interconnected nodes in Appendix C.2, and introduce the associated notation in Appendix C.3. Note that we follow the convention used by Baltensperger et al. [1] and include producers in the notion of service providers, although producers are not an infrastructure service.
Appendix C.1. Model equations
Equations (C.1) describe the mechanics of the spatial partial equilibrium model of the European gas market in detail. We refrain from showing the loss terms in the equations to achieve a more compact notation. 
Service providers, traders and consumers
Anm Transmission system operator of pipeline nm Bnm Shipping company transporting LNG from n to m Cn Consumer at node n In Storage operator injecting gas at node n Ln Liquefaction plant operator at node n Pn Gas producing company at node n Rn Regasification plant operator at node n Sn Storage operator at node n
Fn
The trader associated with producer at node n Xn Storage operator extracting gas at node n Zz Placeholder for a service provider (Pn, In, Xn, Ln, Rn, Anm, Bnm) at node n / arc nm The set of all traders active at node/arc z Z(f ) The set of all nodes/arcs in which service Z is active and are reachable by trader f Table C .3: The parameters are generally described by capital Roman letters. Lower-case Roman letters are only chosen if the parameter is directly linked to a variable of the same name. Occasionally, lower-case Greek letters are chosen to follow conventions. The superscripts indicate whether the parameter is related to a service provider of type Z ∈ {P, L, B, R, A, I, X} or a consumer C. Subscripts indicate the trader f , node/arc z, and the period of the year t the parameter is related to.
Parameters
CAP
Z nt
Maximum capacity of service Z located at z in period t
CAP
ZT n
Maximum capacity of service Z located at z over all periods T
INT C nt
Maximum willingness to pay (intercept of inverse demand function with the s C nt = 0 -axis) of consumers at node n in period t LINC
Z zt
Linear cost function term for service Z located at z in period t
LOSS Z z
Loss factor when using service Z located at z
QUAC
Z zt
Quadratic cost function term for service Z located at z in period t
SLP C nt
Slope of the inverse demand curve of the consumers at node n in period t, is assumed strictly negative Continued on next page Market power parameter of trader f in node n and period t Table C .4: The variables are described by lowercase letters. Primal variables are Roman, while dual variables are Greek letters. The superscripts indicate whether the variable is related to a service provider of type Z ∈ {P, L, B, R, A, I, X}, a consumer C, or a node N . Subscripts indicate the trader f the variable corresponds to, at which node/arc z the transaction or service is located, and in which period of the year t it takes place. Wholesale price at node n in period t 
